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Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the 
Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief 
Bahia Tahzib-Lie∗ 
Religion, spirituality and belief play a central role in the lives of mil-
lions of women and men, in the way they live and in the aspirations 
they have for the future. The right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion is inalienable and must be universally enjoyed.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many horrible events in different parts of the world graphically 
illustrate the need to discuss freedom of religion or belief in relation 
to gender. Among such events is the Taliban’s public beatings of 
women for failing to wear the burqa, as required by its own interpre-
tation of Islamic teachings.2 Recently, the United Nations Secretary-
General recommended that the “[r]elationship between freedom of 
religion and, in particular, the right to manifest religious beliefs, and 
 
 
 
 ∗ This Article is the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect 
the views of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 1. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Platform for Action, U.N. GAOR, 52d 
Sess., Annex II , ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/C.177/20/Rev.1 (1996) [hereinafter Beijing Platform]. 
 2. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance 
considers “the Taliban’s anti-feminine policy in Afghanistan . . . [t]he most tragic illustration.” 
Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., ¶ 111, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58 (1999). He then goes on to note that this policy “is tantamount to 
veritable apartheid against women, as women, and on the basis of specious interpretations of Is-
lam.” Id. Evans has critically observed that “[w]ithout wishing to act as an apologist for the Tali-
ban, the obvious question is what authorizes the Special Rapporteur to make authorative judge-
ments concerning the interpretation of a faith tradition, in this case Islam?” Malcolm D. Evans, 
Religious Diversity and Religious Liberty as Human Right, at 12 (paper submitted for presenta-
tion at the International Conference on Human Rights and Our Responsibilities Towards Future 
Generations: An Inter-Religious Perspective, organized by the Future Generations Programme in 
collaboration with UNESCO and the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Valetta, 
Malta, May 6-8, 1999). In his next report, the Special Rapporteur no longer qualifies the inter-
pretation of the Taliban. See Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, U.N. GAOR, 54th 
Sess., ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/54/386 (1999). 
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women’s right to equality” should be addressed.3 This statement is a 
stark reminder that the silence that traditionally enshrouds this rela-
tionship has only recently been questioned explicitly in international 
fora.4 
Various international human rights instruments stipulate that 
women and men are equally entitled to all human rights and funda-
mental freedoms,5 which includes the right to freedom of religion or 
belief.6 Both a global and a regional instrument7 specifically acknowl-
edge that the enjoyment of this right must be conferred equally on 
both women and men.8 Furthermore, numerous international hu-
man rights instruments contain a clause prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of sex, and, in recent years, on the basis of the wider 
concept of gender.9 It is therefore apparent that a woman’s gender 
 
 3. Integrating the Gender Perspective into the Work of United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/1998/6, ¶ 70(h) (1998) 
[hereinafter Integrating Gender Perspective].  
 4. It has been noted that the apprehensiveness of the U.N. to tackle such allegations is 
not surprising. “The subject is all too often seen as being taboo and too sensitive and volatile to 
raise and seek resolution. However, silence and acquiescence is at the expense of women’s rights 
and, in some cases, their very lives.” CORINNE PACKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN 13 (a report submitted to the Royal Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment, DCE) (The Hague, Jun. 1999) (the published version of this report is forth-
coming in Dutch). 
 5. See, e.g., Beijing Platform, supra note 1, Annex I, ¶¶ 8, 15, 32, 36; Annex II, ¶¶ 5, 
213; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 1 [here-
inafter CEDAW]. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 
art. 3 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 3 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 6. For a compilation of human rights provisions regarding freedom of religion or belief, 
see BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION ap. 499-551 (Martinus Nijhoff 1996); 9 HELSINKI MONITOR 106-
15 (1998). 
 7. See Beijing Platform, supra note 1, Annex I, ¶ 12; Annex II ¶¶ 24, 72, 80(f); Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women 
(available in <wysiwyg://379/http://www.undp.org/rblac/gender/osaviol.htm> (visited Apr. 
19, 2000)). 
 8. It has been noted that various recently-held U.N. conferences have contributed to the 
understanding that women’s equality and nondiscrimination between women and men, as well as 
women’s equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, do not occur automati-
cally as a result of the overall protection and promotion of human rights. See Integrating Gender 
Perspective, supra note 3, ¶ 17. 
 9. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 2(1); CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 1; Beijing Plat-
form, supra note 1, Annex II, ¶¶ 214, 216. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (available in http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (visited Apr. 19, 
2000)). Whereas “sex” refers to biological and physical differences between males and females, 
“gender” refers to socially-constructed differences, taking into account such factors as power im-
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should not be a reason to restrict her right to freedom of religion or 
belief, a right that broadly embraces theistic, nontheistic, and atheis-
tic beliefs. 
This Article examines a number of alleged violations of the right 
to freedom of religion or belief that are primarily directed against 
women or to which women are particularly vulnerable. Women who 
are hampered in their enjoyment of this right are often women who 
object to certain interpretations of their religion or belief imposed by 
religious leaders or society or women who are committed to a differ-
ent religion or belief from that of the wider society. In this Article, 
they are referred to as “dissenting women.” 
The alleged violations below are assessed by using a basic yard-
stick based on international human rights norms, which articulate 
both an internal and an external aspect of the right to freedom of re-
ligion or belief.10 Section II.A addresses situations involving alleged 
violations of internal freedom, which denotes the individual’s inner, 
private domain. Allowing people the freedom to believe in a religion 
or belief of their own choice lies at the heart of internal freedom. 
Section II.B addresses situations involving alleged violations of ex-
ternal freedom. External freedom denotes the outer, often public, 
domain and has been defined as an individual’s “freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to mani-
fest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and obser-
vance.”11 Section III presents conclusions and a number of recom-
mendations that could be helpful in combating violations of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief that are specifically or primarily 
directed against women or to which women are particularly vulner-
able. 
 
balances, socio-economic disparities and culturally-reinforced stereotypes. See Integrating Gender 
Perspective, supra note 3, ¶ 16. Nevertheless, the concepts of “sex” and “gender” tend to be used 
inconsistently or interchangeably in international instruments in the areas of international human 
rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law. See, e.g., PACKER, supra 
note 4, at 23-24; Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig, International Criminal Law and the In-
ternational Criminal Court Statute: Crimes against Women, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., forthcoming). 
 10. For an elaboration, see TAHZIB, supra note 6, chs. 3 & 4. 
 11. UDHR, art. 18; ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 18(1). For a similar definition, see, e.g., 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Relig-
ion or Belief , G.A. Res. 36/55, art. 1(1) (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration]; art. 9(1) ECHR. 
For less elaborate definitions, see, e.g., art. III ADRDM; art. 12(1) ACHR; principle VII of the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, adopted Aug. 1, 1975; art. 
8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981. 
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II.  AN ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF WOMEN’S RIGHT 
TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 
A. Violations of Women’s Internal Freedom 
In assessing situations in which women are restricted in their 
choice of religion or belief, it should be clear that they do not have 
to make a once-in-a-lifetime choice or resign themselves to the relig-
ion or belief passed on to them by their parents, spouse, religious 
leaders, community, or society. Internal freedom means that women 
should be free, at any time, to explore other beliefs and to make their 
own choices as to religious commitment and membership. Internal 
freedom also includes freedom to avoid or openly reject a religion or 
belief if so inclined. 
The relevant human rights instruments recognize internal free-
dom in two ways. First, they stipulate that internal freedom must be 
protected unconditionally and in all circumstances. Therefore, limita-
tions are not permitted even in times of public emergency that 
threaten the life of the nation, such as internal or international armed 
conflict.12 Second, the instruments bar “coercion” that would impair 
internal freedom by forcing a person to adopt certain beliefs.13 Al-
though these instruments do not define coercion, it has been argued 
that the definition of coercion should not be limited to the use of 
physical force or penal sanctions to compel individuals to recant or 
convert.14 Some restrictive policies and practices have been con-
demned as “coercion,” such as those that restrict access to educa-
tion, medical care, employment, or the rights to vote or participate 
in the conduct of public affairs. 
 
 12. See ICCPR,  supra  note 5, art. 4(2); ACHR, art. 27(2). For an elaborate discussion on 
derogation clauses, see Siracusa Principles Limitations and Derogation Provisions in the Interna-
tional Convenant on Civil and Politic Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 1-14, 23-34, 89-131 (1985) 
[hereinafter Limitation and Derogation Provisions]. 
 13. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 18(2); 1981 Declaration, supra  note 11, art. 1(2). For 
the three possible meanings of coercion, see Peter Cumper, Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and 
Religion, in THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED 
KINGDOM LAW 355, 370-71 (David Harris & Sarah Joseph eds., 1995). 
 14. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22(48), art. 18, U.N. Doc. 
A/48/40, Pt. I, ¶ 5 [hereinafter General Comment on art. 18 ICCPR]. Opinions are divided as 
to what constitutes indirect forms of impermissible pressure. For a framework of four interrelated 
variables designed to help disentangle the different factors that states have used to draw the line 
between “proper” and “improper” proselytism, see Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to 
Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 326-38. 
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It is important to understand the scope of internal freedom in 
order to assess situations in which women are limited in their choice 
of religion or belief, particularly in the case of dissenting women. 
Cases of women being abducted and forcibly converted to a particu-
lar religion,15 being forced to marry a man from a different religion 
and convert to his faith,16 being forced to secrecy due to their volun-
tary conversion to another religion,17 and being raped because they 
belong to a certain religion or belief18 are violations of women’s in-
ternal freedom. They exemplify situations in which dissenting 
women are primarily targeted and therefore particularly vulnerable. 
Although a state may not necessarily be involved in a particular act of 
coercion or violence against women, it must take measures to pro-
hibit, prevent, or punish such acts.19 
B. Violations of Women’s External Freedom 
External freedom manifests itself in many ways.20 Nevertheless, 
the relevant instruments enumerate the countervailing interests that 
may justify limiting a person’s external freedom. Only when three 
specific prongs are met may states restrict a particular act. To be 
 
 15. Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches 
for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. 
GAOR, 51st Sess., ¶ 105, U.N. Doc. A/51/542/Add.2 (1996); Implementation of the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Be-
lief, U.N. ESCOR, 52nd Sess., ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.1 (1996). 
 16. Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., ¶ 62(e), U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/6 (1998). 
 17. Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., ¶ 
72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58 (1999). 
 18. Id., ¶¶ 61, 111. 
 19. This may be inferred, for instance, from the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48 104 (1993) [hereinafter DEVAW], which rejects 
the private-public distinction in making clear that states have a duty to prevent and punish all vio-
lence against women. See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58, ¶ 101 (1999). It has further been 
argued that ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 2(1) imposes such an affirmative obligation on states. See 
Courtney W. Howland, Safeguarding Women’s Political Freedoms Under the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights in the Face of Religious Fundamentalism, in RELIGIOUS 
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 93, 93-103 (Courtney W. Howland 
ed., 1999) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS]. 
 20. For a comprehensive list of examples, see 1981 Declaration, supra note 11, art. 6. See 
also Principle 16 of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the 
Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Nov. 4, 1986-
Jan. 17, 1989. 
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permissible, restrictions must be: (1) prescribed by law; (2) in pursu-
ance of one or more compelling state interests—namely, public 
safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and free-
doms of others (excluding, for example, national security); and (3) 
necessary to protect one or more of the aforementioned state inter-
ests.21 
It has been pointed out that this three-prong test must not be 
applied in a manner that would vitiate a person’s enjoyment of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief.22 Furthermore, states may not 
impose restrictions for discriminatory purposes or apply them in a 
discriminatory manner.23 Discrimination on the grounds of gender, 
sex, or religion is therefore prohibited. The onus is on the state to 
demonstrate that any restriction it imposes satisfies the three-prong 
test. 
To determine the legitimacy of state interference with external 
freedom in a given case, the state’s actions must be assessed in terms 
of the above prongs. This has proven difficult, since the prongs are 
often interpreted in different ways. In particular, the state interests 
referred to in the second prong are often difficult to define and imply 
a measure of relativity, in that they may change according to circum-
stance and country. Hence, for the purpose of interpretation, states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21. For the relevant limitation clauses, see, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 18(3); ECHR, 
supra note 11, art. 9(2). The ECHR determines that the third condition should be necessary “in 
a democratic society.” In the view of the European Court of Human Rights, democratic society 
necessarily presupposes religious pluralism. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 
at 17 (1993). See also Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments 
& Dec. 1346, 1362-63 (1996). With this understanding, practice has shown that this addition is 
more a case of verbiage than of substance. For a detailed discussion on limitation clauses, see 
Limitations and Derogation Provisions, supra note 12, at 1-22, 35-88, 155. 
 22. General Comment on art. 18 ICCPR, supra note 14, ¶ 8. The Human Rights Com-
mittee also recommended that in “[i]nterpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, States 
Parties should proceed from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, in-
cluding the right to equality and non-discrimination on all grounds specified in Articles 2, 3 and 
26.” Id.  This has also been emphasized by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance. 
See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.2, ¶¶ 110(b), 122 (1998). 
 23. General Comment on art. 18 ICCPR, supra note 14, ¶ 8. 
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are allowed a certain, though not unlimited, measure of latitude, 
commonly referred to as the “margin of appreciation.”24 
To illustrate alleged violations of women’s external freedom, this 
section considers three situations in which women have claimed that 
state officials have illegitimately restricted their external freedom of 
religion or belief. Each case involves sensitive, controversial, and 
complex issues in contemporary societies. The first concerns a tradi-
tional practice affecting the health of women and girls, and the sec-
ond and third concern dress codes for women in secular and non-
secular societies. It should be emphasized that no value judgement 
concerning the beliefs involved is intended.25 
Each case demands a careful balancing of the competing interests 
of the state and the woman. The outcome of the balancing process 
depends on whether the state has met the three-prong test described 
above. In all three cases, it is assumed that the first prong of the test 
has been fulfilled—that the state in question has enacted legislation 
expressly prohibiting the contested manifestation of religion or be-
lief, which legislation is “accessible, unambiguous, drawn narrowly 
and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a 
particular action is unlawful.”26 In other words, the law describes any 
 
 
 
 24. In developing the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights adopted the view that, in principle, the national or local authorities are in a better 
position than international courts to assess the situation and determine the necessity of certain 
restrictions. See Pieter van Dijk, A Common Standard of Achievement: About Universal Validity 
and Uniform Interpretation of International Human Rights Norms, 13 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 
105, 114-19 (1995). 
 25. It has been critically noted that “[i]f one’s religious beliefs dictate . . . the subjugation 
of women, they do not cease to do so merely because this is deemed incompatible with human 
rights protection. One might be required as a matter of public order or in the interests of preserv-
ing the rights of others to refrain from manifesting those rights, but is it the place of human rights 
law to attempt to influence and judge the validity of those beliefs themselves? . . . [I]t needs to be 
accepted that in recognizing the freedom of religion, the international system is recognizing the 
intrusion of systems of belief which are of fundamental importance to the believer and which may 
dictate patterns of behaviour which simply cannot be contained within the existing web of human 
rights thinking.” Evans, supra note 2, at 13 (endnotes omitted). 
 26. Question of the Human Rights of all Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or Im-
prisonment, U.N. EXCOR, 52nd Sess., Annex principle 1.1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39 
(1996). See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.2, ¶¶ 107(d), 110(b) (1998). It has been 
suggested that the first condition also extends to unwritten norms of common law that are clearly 
expressed. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 324 (1993). 
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prohibited act in clear, precise, and unambiguous terms, with a view 
to making everyone fully aware of what is prohibited.27 
1. The freedom to undergo female genital mutilation vs. the protection 
of public health 
The following example concerns women and girls who rely upon 
their religion or belief to defend their freedom to undergo female 
genital mutilation (FGM).28 These women argue that FGM is a relig-
iously-prescribed or religiously-motivated ritual “associated with cer-
tain stages of life”29 and therefore a part of their external freedom of 
religion or belief.30 In a country that specifically bans any form of 
FGM in the interests of public health, the law of the state typically 
conflicts with this practice prescribed by or associated with their re-
ligion or belief. Thus, the issue is whether the state action justifies 
the restriction of external freedom. 
To justify the restriction in the interests of “public health,”31 
public authorities must demonstrate that the health effects of FGM 
 
 27. For examples of vague, imprecise, and so-called “catch-all” provisions, see U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.2, ¶ 107 (1998). 
 28. FGM is described as comprising “all procedures involving partial or total removal of 
the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs, for cultural, religious or 
other non-therapeutic reasons.” FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A JOINT 
WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA STATEMENT 3 (1997). 
 29. General Comment on art. 18 ICCPR, supra note 14, ¶ 4. 
 30. FGM is known to be practiced in many areas of the world among followers of different 
religions and beliefs, including Christians of many denominations, Sunni and Shiite Muslims, 
Ethiopian Jews (the Falasha), and adherents of indigenous African beliefs. Although occasionally 
some religious leaders have publicly supported, encouraged, or condoned such views, it has been 
widely argued that the practice of FGM does not originate with religions such as Islam, Christian-
ity, or Judaism. See, e.g., The Implementation of the Human Rights of Women, U.N. ESCOR, 51st 
Sess., ¶ 41, 47-50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/14 (1999) (referring to a decision of the 
Egyptian Council of State and a symposium of 26 religious leaders and medical personnel from 
eleven African countries held in Banjul, Gambia, July 20-24, 1998, which emphasized that FGM 
is not prescribed by any religion); DANISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DANIDA), 
GUIDELINES ON THE PREVENTION OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION 4, 19 (2d rev. ed. 1986) 
[hereinafter FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION]. Although many claim that FGM has erroneously 
been associated with religion, this does not alter the fact that women and girls who fail to demon-
strate that FGM is associated with religion could alternatively argue that the practice is associated 
with nontheistic or atheistic belief and on that basis still demand protection of their external free-
dom of religion or belief. 
 31. The “public health” ground may be invoked “in order to allow a state to take meas-
ures dealing with a serious threat to the health of the population or individual members of the 
population. These measures must be specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing 
care for the sick and injured.” See Limitation and Derogation Provisions, supra note 12, at 3, 6. 
TAZ-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  9:53 PM 
967] Applying a Gender Perspective 
 975 
are serious. For instance, they can produce evidence of the immedi-
ate and long-term health risks FGM entails, which vary depending 
on the nature and extremity of the procedure followed.32 Physical 
complications include hemorrhage, severe pain, damage to surround-
ing organs, urinary retention, keloids, and, in some cases, death. Be-
yond physical injury, the health consequences may extend to severe 
shock, emotional stress, and various psychological, sexual, and re-
productive disorders.33 Furthermore, the state may demonstrate that 
the strong consensus of the world community, as evidenced in nu-
merous international forums and nongovernmental organizations, 
has denounced FGM as a serious threat to the health of women and 
girls and called upon states to legislate against it.34 The public au-
thorities will thereby argue that they have satisfied the compelling 
state interest and necessity prongs since the restriction is necessary in 
the interest of public health. 
Women making an informed choice to undergo FGM may nev-
ertheless counter that the restriction is unnecessary to protect public 
health, since only the participant’s health is at stake. These women 
argue that the state must distinguish between those manifestations of 
religion or belief that endanger the health of other persons and those 
that only affect the health of the participant and that only in the 
former case would it be justifiable for the state to invoke “public 
health” as a ground for imposing a restriction. 
 However, this line of reasoning is untenable. First, FGM can 
lead to complications during pregnancy and childbirth, thereby en-
dangering the life and health of the unborn child.35 If the woman has 
a sexual partner, the psychosexual and psychological effects of FGM 
could give rise to conflict with the partner and therefore affect his 
health and well-being. In addition, a sexually active woman who has 
 
 32. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/54/341 (1999); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/42, Pt. I (1986). 
 33. For more detail, see, e.g., Heidi Jones et. al, Female Genital Cutting Practices in Burk-
ina Faso and Mali and Their Negative Health Outcomes, 30 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 219, 220 (1999); 
Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Girls, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/42, Pt. I (1986). 
 34. For a concise overview of action taken by the U.N. system, see Traditional or Custom-
ary Practices Affecting the Health of Women: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/341 (1999). The WHO, UNICEF, and UNFPA issued a joint statement in 1997. See 
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 28. 
 35. “Logistic regression analyses have shown significant positive relationships between the 
severity of genital cutting and the probability that a woman would have gynecological and obstet-
ric complications.” Jones et. al, supra note 33, at 219. 
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contracted a blood borne disease, such as hepatitis B or HIV/AIDS, 
as a result of undergoing FGM may transmit this disease to others 
and thereby put their health at risk.36 
Moreover, it seems reasonable that states have an obligation to 
protect the public, most notably women and girls, from the risks as-
sociated with FGM and its detrimental effects on health.37 For the 
same reason, states regularly inform the public about the harmful ef-
fects of excessive alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking.38 The 
very nature of a public health system implies that the community as a 
whole will bear the costs of treating complications from FGM. 
Hence, the financial implications for the community are another rea-
son why it is in the “public” interest to ban the practice. Further-
more, in many African countries, FGM constitutes “a major public 
health problem for health services that are already overburdened and 
frequently deficient.”39 
Some women may object to this line of reasoning and argue that 
states rarely ban excessive alcohol consumption and cigarette smok-
ing. Adults are allowed to make choices about their own bodies, in-
cluding those that may adversely affect their health and the public 
health system. In response, it could be pointed out that international 
fora have specifically called upon states to develop, adopt, and im-
plement national legislation and policies prohibiting FGM and to 
prosecute the perpetrators of this practice.40 Unlike excessive alcohol 
consumption and cigarette smoking, FGM is banned because it con-
stitutes an irreversible physical intervention with immediate and 
long-term health risks. According to this line of thinking, the adult’s  
 
 
 
 36. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REGIONAL PLAN OF ACTION TO ACCELERATE THE 
ELIMINATION OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION IN AFRICA 4 (1997). 
 37. This obligation is explicitly set forth in art. 24(3) of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. See also 1981 Declaration, supra note 11, art. 5(5). Although not expressly mentioned 
in ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 12, and CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 12, this obligation can be in-
ferred from these provisions. See BRIGIT C.A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN 
RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-58, 129, 148, 154, 258, 267-68, 332 (1998). 
 38. This line of reasoning has been used in regard to the state obligation to inform the 
public, including children, of the risks of contracting HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted 
diseases. See Corinne Packer, Sex Education: Child’s Rights, Parent’s Choice or State’s Obligation, 
in OF INNOCENCE AND AUTONOMY (forthcoming 2000). 
 39. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 36, at 4. 
 40. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 54/133 of 17 Dec. 1999, ¶ 3(d), U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/133 
(2000). 
TAZ-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  9:53 PM 
967] Applying a Gender Perspective 
 977 
consent does not preclude a state from prohibiting persons from in-
juring themselves.41 
There are reasons to recognize FGM as a public health threat, 
and paternalistic health legislation against it has a legitimate ground 
for restricting a woman’s external freedom of religion or belief. More 
importantly, it should be acknowledged that “public health” includes 
both collective and individual health interests.42 From the foregoing, 
it can be inferred that the state will satisfy the second and the third 
prongs and that it therefore legitimately interfered with the external 
freedom of women and girls. 
2. The freedom to wear religious clothing in public employment vs. the 
protection of public order or morals 
Women have the right to wear religiously-prescribed or relig-
iously-motivated headdress, since “the wearing of distinctive clothing 
or headcoverings” qualifies as an observance or practice of religion or 
belief.43 Nevertheless, there have been several cases of protest against 
women and girls wearing headscarves in public settings in secularized 
states.44 Women who stand out because of clothing associated with 
 
 41. For an analogous case see Bhinder v. Canada (Communication No. 208/1986, Views 
of 9 Nov. 1989), U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Vol. II), Annex IX, sect. E (1990). This case deals with a 
naturalized Canadian citizen and a Sikh by religion, whose labor contract as a maintenance elec-
trician with the Canadian National Railway Company was terminated as a result of his refusal to 
wear safety headgear during his work, which would require him to relinquish his turban. From 
the views of the Human Rights Committee, it can be inferred that paternalistic health and safety 
legislation falls within the scope of legitimate restrictions. For a discussion, see TAHZIB, supra 
note 6, at 294-300. 
 42. See, e.g., Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. et al., Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on 
Limitation Provisions, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 35, 64-65 (1985). See also Siracusa Principles, supra note 
31, at 6; Alexandre Kiss, Commentary by the Rapporteur on the Limitation Provisions, 7 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 15, 20 (1985). 
 43. General Comment on art. 18 ICCPR, supra note 14, ¶ 4. Incomprehensibly, however, 
the European Commission on Human Rights held that the wearing of religiously-prescribed or 
religiously-motivated headscarves is not embraced by external freedom. Karaduman v. Turkey, 74 
D&R 93, 108-09 (1993). It is questionable whether the European Court of Human Rights 
would agree with this holding. In Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, the Court found that “the 
right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the 
part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs 
are legitimate.” Manoussakis and Others , supra note 23, at 1365. 
 44. For a detailed analysis and interpretation of the passages of the Koran relating to the 
hijab, the veil, see FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST 
INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN ISLAM 85-101 (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., 1991). For 
the meaning and implications of wearing the veil for Muslim women who choose to do so, see 
Fatheena Mubarak, Muslim Women and Religious Identification: Women and the Veil, in MANY 
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their religion have also experienced harassment and discrimination in 
public employment.45 
The international media highlighted, for instance, the case of a 
Turkish woman wearing a hijab. On May 2, 1999, Merve Kavakçi 
was prevented from taking oath as an elected member of the Turkish 
National Assembly because she refused, in compliance with the pre-
scriptions of her religion, to remove her headcovering in the meeting 
hall.46  
The hypothetical case in this context concerns legislation that 
prohibits the wearing of religiously-prescribed or religiously-
motivated headscarves in public employment. The rationale behind 
such legislation is that wearing a headdress of this kind is a political 
symbol of female submission and therefore violates the religious and 
political neutrality required of all civil servants. The question is 
whether the state may prohibit a woman from making a knowing, 
informed, and uncoerced decision to wear her headscarf in the work-
place. 
It is not readily clear how the state could justify its ban on 
women in public office wearing a religiously-prescribed or relig-
iously-motivated headscarf. From the narrow set of permissible, 
compelling state interests, the only conceivable possibilities would be 
the protection of morals or public order. Yet these choices seem to 
run the risk of compelling interest inflation47 and hence of being  
 
 
 
 
RELIGIONS, ALL AUSTRALIAN: RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENT, IDENTITY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
123 (Gary D. Bouma ed., 1997) [hereinafter MANY RELIGIONS, ALL AUSTRALIAN]. It has been 
argued, however, that the function of the veil at the time of Muhammad was to protect women, 
and thus the veil’s most appropriate modern equivalent is education and schooling, which, in our 
times, gives the most protection to a woman. SOHEIB BENCHEIKH, MARIANE ET LE PROPHÈTE: 
L’ISLAM DANS LA FRANCE LAÏQUE 142-45 (1998). 
 45. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANN. REP. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999, 
at 248 (2000) (describing a case in Germany); Civil and Political Rights, Including: Freedom of 
Expression, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., ¶ 37(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58/ 
Add.1, ¶ 37(a) (1998). 
 46. This case has been characterized as “disturbing.” See Oral Statement on Freedom of Re-
ligion or Belief by the Finnish Presidency of the European Union to the OSCE Review Conference, 
Human Dimension, Vienna, 23 Sept. 1999, OSCE Doc. RC.DEL/103/99, ¶ 5 (1999). 
 47. The Human Rights Committee has expressed concern at official enforcement of strict 
dress requirements for women in public places “under the guise of public order and morality.” 
U.N. Doc. A/53/40, ¶ 133 (1998). 
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“used as a pretext for reintroducing unwarranted forms of interfer-
ence.”48 
The notion of “morals” is inherently vague and fluid, differing 
from time to time, from culture to culture, and from one political 
system to another.49 It is not derived from any single tradition or re-
ligion but from “many social, philosophical and religious tradi-
tions.”50 It has been noted that the fluid nature of morals “would 
presumably create a significant obstacle” against violating an individ-
ual’s external freedom in the name of one particular religion or ide-
ology.51 In other words, the concept of morals may not be invoked 
to curtail the external freedom of a person who does not embrace a 
particular religion or ideology.52 It is therefore hard to understand 
how the protection of morals can be invoked as a compelling state 
interest. 
Under the three-prong test, it is similarly difficult to invoke pro-
tection of public order as a compelling state interest. In the context 
of limitations on external freedom of religion or belief, “public or-
der” should not be confused with a similar sounding French legal 
expression used in civil and administrative law, l’ordre public.53 Con-
sidering that the former concept should be narrowly construed to 
mean the prevention of public disorder, the state’s argument that an 
 
 48. David Little, Studying “Religious Human Rights”: Methodological Foundations, in 
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 60 (Johan D. 
van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). 
 49. It should be noted that even in a relatively homogeneous region such as western 
Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has struggled to agree upon a common European 
concept of “morals” in the domestic law of European states. The Court concluded that notions of 
morals vary “from time to time and from place to place especially in an era which is characterised 
by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinion on the subject.” Handyside v. U.K., 24 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 22 (ser. A) (1976). 
 50. General Comment on art. 18 ICCPR, supra note 14, ¶ 8. 
 51. Little, supra note 48, at 60. 
 52. See General Comment on art. 18 ICCPR, supra note 14, ¶¶ 9 & 10. 
 53. Unlike comparable limitation clauses in the ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 18(3), lacks the 
parenthetical term ordre public. Furthermore, the French text of this provision refers to la protec-
tion de l’ordre. This means that the expression “public order” may therefore only be used to 
“avoid disturbances to the order in the narrow sense,” NOWAK, supra note 26, at 327, and not 
“to protect ordre public with its general connotations of national public policy,” Karl Josef 
Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 209, 212 (Louis Henkin 
ed., 1981). It should be emphasized that “the protection of public order” in ECHR, supra note 
11, art. 9(2), which deals with limitations on external freedom of religion or belief, should also be 
equated with the prevention of disorder. For an explanation, see Lockwood, supra note 42, at 56-
61. 
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employee wearing a headscarf would disrupt order in the workplace 
or the smooth running of the public sector seems rather untenable. 
Assuming, however, that the state can demonstrate that its ac-
tions were in the interest of public order or morals, the issue remains 
as to whether the restriction was necessary. In other words, it should 
be determined whether the restriction is proportionate to the com-
pelling state interest pursued and whether it is applied with a dis-
criminatory purpose or in a discriminatory manner. When a woman 
is prohibited from wearing religious clothing in public employment, 
the question of necessity depends on the inherent requirements of 
the woman’s job, the employing institution’s objectives, and her em-
ployer’s goodwill. 
In regard to assessing the question of necessity in this case, a 
number of conventions of the International Labour Organisation 
give specific guidance. For instance, Convention No. 122 concern-
ing Employment Policy emphasizes that “there is freedom of choice 
of employment and the fullest possible opportunity for each worker 
to qualify for, and to use his skills and endowments in, a job for 
which he is well suited, irrespective of . . . sex, religion.”54 Further-
more, Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation prohibits, as a general rule, “any dis-
tinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of . . . sex, relig-
ion . . . which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of op-
portunity or treatment in employment or occupation.”55 Exempt 
from this general rule is any distinction, exclusion, or preference in 
respect to a particular job based on the inherent requirements of the 
job.56 The objectives underlying such requirements of the job may be 
assessed in terms of whether they are truly necessary or merely arbi-
trary.57 For instance, preference in employment for a person holding 
a particular religious or other belief does not amount to discrimina-
tion if that belief is a genuine qualification for the job.58 
 
 
 54. Art. 1(2)(c). 
 55. Art. 1(1)(a). 
 56. Art. 1(2). 
 57. International Labour Office, ILO Standards and Action for the Elimination of Dis-
crimination and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity in Employment, U.N. Doc. 
HR/GENEVA/1984/WP.15, ¶ 32 (1984). 
 58. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ARTICLE 18 - FREEDOM 
OF RELIGION AND BELIEF 78, IN PARTICULAR RECOMMENDATIONS R4.1.1 & R4.1.2. (1998). 
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In determining whether the necessity prong is satisfied, an im-
portant factor is whether the restriction on the woman’s external 
freedom was applied with discriminatory purpose or in a discrimina-
tory manner. In the present case, it can be argued that the purpose,59 
or alternatively the effect,60 of the state-imposed restriction is dis-
criminatory on the basis of religion because virtually the only group 
it affects are members of Muslim denominations that require women 
to wear headscarves.61 Assuming that simply wearing a religiously-
prescribed or religiously-motivated headscarf violates the religious 
and political neutrality required of all civil servants, it is important to 
determine whether the policy is uniformly enforced. For example, 
does the state also object on the same grounds to its employees 
wearing other religiously-prescribed or religiously-motivated gar-
ments such as the Jewish yarmulke (skullcap), Roman Catholic col-
lar, or Sikh turban? Does it treat religiously-prescribed or religiously-
motivated garments differently from religious ornaments such as a 
necklace with a Christian crucifix? Does it countenance religious 
symbols or accessories, such as a Christmas tree in the workplace?62 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the effect of the state-imposed 
restriction is discriminatory on the grounds of sex or gender because 
the requirement to wear religiously-prescribed or religiously-
motivated headscarves applies only to women. 
In contrast, some may argue that the scarf represents female 
submission and that women should therefore be protected against it. 
However, women who make an informed choice to wear a headscarf 
may argue that the scarf should be viewed as a religious practice and  
 
 
 59. Situations in which the purpose is discriminatory are referred to as direct or intentional 
discrimination. 
 60. Situations in which the effect is discriminatory are referred to as indirect or incidental 
discrimination. Indirect discrimination occurs when a practice or policy purports to treat everyone 
in the same manner, but in effect, disadvantages a higher proportion of people from a particular 
religious or other belief group and is not reasonable under the circumstances. 
 61. For a definition of discrimination based on religion or belief, see 1981 Declaration, 
supra note 11, art. 2(2). 
 62. It has been observed that “[w]hile wearing a scarf-like headcovering is relatively in-
nocuous, full covering is clearly more obvious than the wearing of a cross or a yarmulke. Yet, mi-
nority religious rights are drained of much of their meaning if ‘acceptable’ religious practices are 
defined by reference to majority religious traditions.” Barbara Roblin Mirza, Selected Personal 
Rights and Freedoms: Rights to Wear Clothing of One’s Choice, to Drive, and to Travel Unattended 
and Without Permission, in III WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 134 (Kelly 
D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., forthcoming 2000). 
TAZ-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  9:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
982 
should be respected and understood as overt religiosity, including 
connection with minority religions.63 
Having determined that some form of discrimination has taken 
place, the next question to decide is whether such a restriction is a 
legitimate occupational qualification. This is important to the deter-
mination of whether the contested legislation was based on objective 
criteria. To answer the question, it is important to know the nature 
of the job and the employing institution’s objectives. For instance, as 
regards a public teaching post, the state may take into consideration 
the impact on young, impressionable pupils of a teacher wearing a 
headscarf in the classroom, the educational role of teachers, and the 
pupils’ emulation of their teachers as role models.64 It should, how-
ever, also consider whether the teacher embraces the same norms 
and values as the school and whether she would be likely to prosely-
tize in the classroom. It is interesting to see whether the state would 
also apply the same criteria to a teacher who is a nun and wears a 
habit in the classroom. Another example is found in the armed 
forces, where specific conditions may preclude the wearing of certain 
kinds of headdress.65 
An additional factor in determining whether the necessity prong 
is satisfied is to assess the goodwill of a public employer in the event 
of a complaint. To do so, it is important to examine the attitude he 
or she adopted when offered the opportunity to reconcile a clash of 
interests and to consider whether he or she was unwilling to com-
promise or make allowances to accommodate differences. In fact, 
this analysis is another way of establishing whether the public em-
ployer opted for the least restrictive means of achieving the compel-
ling state interest involved. Public employers would benefit from a 
 
 63. For a discussion of the variety of reasons advanced by Muslim women who make an 
informed choice to wear Muslim dress and a refutal of state justifications for a ban of such dress, 
see Mirza, supra note 62. 
 64. For a discussion of a current dispute in Germany involving the place of Muslim dress in 
the public schools, see William Barbieri, Group Rights and the Muslim Diaspora, 21 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 907, 921-25 (1999). 
 65. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). Goldman involved an ortho-
dox Jewish rabbi who was also a member of the U.S. Air Force. His obligation to wear a yarmulke 
conflicted with military regulation that required him to keep his head uncovered while on duty 
indoors. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected his application for an exemption, 
emphasizing the military interest in uniformity. By contrast, the British army has traditionally al-
lowed Sikh soldiers to wear turbans. See Leon Shaskolsky-Sheleff, Rabbi Captain Goldman’s 
Yarmulke, Freedom of Religion and Conscience, and Civil (Military) Disobedience, in 17 ISRAEL 
Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 197, 203 (1987). 
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recommendation to an Australian firm: “[w]ith employer goodwill, 
much may be done to ensure that such believers have just as good 
job prospects as anyone else. Allowing an employee to wear a . . . 
head-scarf in the firm’s colours may seem, but is not, a trivial re-
sponse, because through this action the employer indirectly acknowl-
edges Australian religious diversity and respect for the individual.”66 
In the case of religious dress, unlike the FGM case described in 
section II.B.1, states will generally have difficulty showing that the 
second and the third prongs have been satisfied. In this connection, 
it should also be emphasized that the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
religious intolerance has urged that “dress should not be the subject 
of political regulation and calls for flexible and tolerant attitudes in 
this regard, so as to allow the variety and richness of . . . garments to 
manifest themselves without constraint.”67 Although there are rea-
sons to believe that in the balancing process more weight should be 
given to the woman’s external freedom, whether the state’s curtail-
ment of her external freedom will be considered justified will ulti-
mately depend on the particulars of the individual case. 
3. The freedom to refuse to wear religious garments in public vs. the 
protection of public order or morals 
Some nonsecular states impose legislation tailored to the domi-
nant religion’s interpretation on all citizens regardless of their be-
liefs.68 They may, for instance, require all women to observe a restric-
tive dress code in public.69 Dissenting women (including members of 
 
 66. Juliet Sheen, Living Within the Tensions of Plurality: Religious Discrimination and 
Human Rights Law and Policy, in MANY RELIGIONS, ALL AUSTRALIAN, supra note 44, at 162, 
171-72. 
 67. U.N. Doc. A/51/542/Add.2, ¶ 140 (1996). See also U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2, ¶ 97 (1996). 
 68. Such situations give rise to a variety of questions regarding the law to be applied to 
different religious or secular groups living within the same nonsecular country, including: 
Should the same law be applied to everyone or should it be so only as long as it is 
nonreligious or secular law? If only religious law governs, what of those persons who 
do not want to be governed by religious law? If the state only allows religious law, 
then is each religious community entitled to its own laws? Should a state have some 
persons governed under religious law and some under secular law? May an individ-
ual chose the system of law by which she wants to be governed? 
Courtney W. Howland, Introduction, in RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS, supra note 19, at xviii. 
These issues are addressed by Howland on pages 143-78. 
 69. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/6, ¶ 60(a) (1998); Human Rights Questions: 
Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the Effective Enjoyment 
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the state religion who object to the state’s interpretation of the relig-
ion’s female dress standards) have found it difficult to change such 
laws or the attitudes of co-religionists and their society as a whole.70 
In some nonsecular states, women who fail to comply in public with 
religiously-prescribed or religiously-motivated dress codes allegedly 
risk detention, ill-treatment, and severe punishment.71 It has even 
been alleged that such states have condoned extrajudicial killing.72 
The following hypothetical case concerns religiously-prescribed 
or religiously-motivated legislation that requires all women in a par-
ticular nonsecular state, regardless of their religion or belief, to wear 
garments that cover them from head to toe in public.73 The rationale 
behind such laws is that wearing religious garments is prescribed by 
or associated with the state religion. Since such laws apply to the en-
tire public sphere and not only public employment, it should be 
noted that a dissenting woman in this nonsecular state is far more re-
stricted in her external freedom than a state employee wearing a 
headscarf in the secular state who is not altogether precluded from 
wearing her scarf outside her job. 
For reasons similar to those relating to the case described in Sec-
tion II.B.2, legislation of this kind is difficult to place within the pa-
rameters of permissible restriction. The question is what compelling 
state interest the state would invoke if a woman who embraces a dif-
ferent religion or belief from that of her society, or who belongs to a 
different branch of the same religion, objects to observing a restric-
 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., ¶31(a)(i), U.N. Doc. 
A/52/477 (1997); U.N. Doc. A/51/542/Add.2, ¶ 51 (1996); U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2, ¶ 27 (1996); Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, U.N. ESCOR, 51st 
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/91 (1994). 
 70. For a discussion, see Bouthaina Shaaban, The Muted Voices of Women Interpreters, in 
FAITH & FREEDOM: WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 61 (Mahnaz Afkhami 
ed., 1995) [hereinafter FAITH & FREEDOM]. For instance, in her book AL-SUFUR WA’L-HIJAB, 
published in 1928, Nazira Zin al-Din, a Muslim woman interpreter, set out to demonstrate that 
neither the text of the Koran nor the hadith require Muslim women to wear hijab and concluded 
that hijab is prohibited by the Islamic Shari’a. 
 71. See, e.g., FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 78 (Kevin Boyle & 
Juliet Sheen eds., 1997) [hereinafter A WORLD REPORT]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAUDI 
ARABIA: A SECRET STATE OF SUFFERING 2 (AI Index MDE 23/01/00) (2000). 
 72. See A WORLD REPORT, supra note 71, at 25. 
 73. In his latest report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance names Af-
ghanistan and Saudi Arabia as examples in this regard. See Elimination of All Forms of Religious 
Intolerance, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., ¶¶ 41-42, U.N. Doc. A/54/386 (1999). 
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tive dress code. As in the case of a state employee wearing a veil, the 
only conceivable state interest seems to be the protection of morals 
and public order. Here again, the question is whether curtailment of 
a woman’s external freedom is legitimate in such circumstances. For 
instance, imposing strict dress standards as a means of protecting  
morals has been qualified as one of “the most repressive governmen-
tal actions.” 74 
Assuming that in this situation the first two prongs are fulfilled, 
the question of whether the limitation meets the necessity prong re-
mains open to debate. Once again, it could be argued that state in-
terference is directly or indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of 
sex, gender, or religion and that it conveys disrespect for dissenting 
women. The Human Rights Committee has pointed out that 
[t]he fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is 
established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise 
the majority of the population shall not result in any impairment of 
the enjoyment of any of the rights under the [International] Cove-
nant [on Civil and Political Rights], including articles 18 and 27, 
nor in any discrimination against adherents of other religions or 
non-believers.75 
Since women who refuse to observe a restrictive dress code in 
public are likely targets of violence in some states, the protection of 
public order argument is somewhat understandable though not nec-
essarily convincing. It is therefore doubtful whether the state’s cur-
tailment of women’s external freedom is permissible in such cases. 
There are reasons to believe that a woman’s external freedom could 
weigh more heavily in the balance, but, especially considering the 
margin of appreciation of the state, there are also reasons to counter 
this, for instance, when a state insists that the imposition of a strict 
dress code is an essential component of public morality. 
Assuming that the three-prong test has been satisfied and that 
the woman is free to refuse to wear the veil in public, she must then 
determine what price she is willing to pay to pursue this practice. 
Sometimes the pressure may force many women to veil themselves, 
as illustrated by the following quotation: “None of us want to wear 
the veil. But fear is stronger than our convictions or our will to be 
 
 74. See T. Jeremy Gunn, Ceasar’s Sword: The 1997 Law of the Russian Federation on the 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43, 86-87 (1998). 
 75. General Comment on art. 18 ICCPR, supra note 14, ¶ 9. 
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free. Fear is all around us. Our parents, our brothers, are unanimous: 
Wear the veil and stay alive.”76 These words are a stark reminder of 
the obligation of states to refrain from engaging in violence against 
women and to exercise due diligence to prevent acts of violence 
against them, regardless of whether those acts are perpetrated by the 
state or by private persons.77 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Section II.A provided a variety of examples of violations of 
women’s internal freedom of religion or belief, and Section II.B con-
sidered three situations of alleged violations of women’s external 
freedom of religion or belief. Violations of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief that are specifically targeted against women and 
those to which women are particularly vulnerable should be re-
dressed. This requires gender sensitivity towards freedom of religion 
or belief. To eliminate such violations, more attention should be 
given to the following six subject areas: (1) the forms of coercion 
that curtail women’s internal freedom of religion or belief; (2) the 
type of restrictions that affect their external freedom of religion or 
belief; (3) the permissibility of these gender-specific forms of coer-
cion and restriction; (4) the nature and frequency of such coercion 
and restriction; (5) the kinds of society in which they take place; and, 
(6) the reasons behind curtailments of women’s right to freedom of 
religion or belief.78 
Governments, parliaments, international organizations, nongov-
ernmental and community organizations, religious leaders and insti-
tutions, educators, public opinion leaders, experts, activists, and the 
media have an important role to play in advancing women’s equal 
right to freedom of religion or belief, including the promotion of a 
collective and individual awareness of this right of women. 
 
 
 76. Karima Bennoune, S.O.S. Algeria: Women’s Human Rights Under Siege, in FAITH & 
FREEDOM, supra note 70, at 187 n.19. 
 77. See DEVAW, supra note 19, art. 4 (stipulating that “[s]tates should condemn violence 
against women and should not invoke any . . . religious consideration to avoid their obligations 
with respect to its elimination”). See also U.N. Commission on Human Rights Res. 1999/42 of 
26 Apr. 1999, ¶¶ 3, 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/42 (1999). 
 78. For some recommendations, see Bahia Tahzib-Lie, Women’s Equal Right to Freedom of 
Religion or Belief: An Important But Neglected Subject, in RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS, supra 
note 19, at 123-24. 
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For instance, when addressing the right to freedom of religion or 
belief in their area of work, governments and nongovernmental or-
ganizations should not ignore the gender perspective. To that end 
they could identify alleged gender-specific abuses, collect specific in-
formation on the situation of dissenting women, and formulate rec-
ommendations specific to women. Such information could, for in-
stance, be incorporated in their reports on freedom of religion and 
the section dealing with this freedom in their country-specific re-
ports. 
Furthermore, international and national courts and human rights 
treaty organizations should incorporate a gender perspective in their 
interpretations of norms relating to religious freedom. For example, 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women and the Human Rights Committee might both consider 
formulating a general recommendation or comment on one or more 
of the above-mentioned subject areas. They could also consider for-
mulating a joint general recommendation or comment. By way of in-
terpretation and elaboration based on the experience gained through 
the supervisory activities of these treaty bodies, such statements 
would contribute to the development of the normative content of 
treaty provisions on the freedom of religion or belief, the right to 
equality, and the prohibition of discrimination based on religion, be-
lief, sex, and gender. Such statements would also promote more ef-
fective implementation of these treaty provisions. 
Finally, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance 
should continue to examine the question of the enjoyment by 
women of their right to freedom of religion or belief, in particular, 
the obstacles which dissenting women face. 
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